A case study to assess the survivability of a large-scale urban Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) network is presented. The ITS for the city of Boise, Idaho was analyzed using two different survivability assessment techniques that are discussed and summarized here. The first approach provides a qualitative assessment of the Boise ITS; it is based on the Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) method as modified for critical infrastructures. The second approach provides a quantitative assessment of network survivability using a multilayered graph-based approach consisting of the greater Boise area power grid and surface transportation system. The power grid and the physical and control transportation graphs were analyzed to determine the relative criticality of different network components. Macroscopic modeling was used to investigate the effect of components' failure on the network's operational characteristics. The greater Boise area has a population of over half a million people. The analysis presented here serves as a case study showing the means of assessing the importance of different components in critical infrastructure layers. The results have enabled traffic operators and decision makers in the Boise area to understand the effects of failure events and to prioritize threat mitigation alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
For the most part, North American surface transportation systems have evolved in a relatively benign environment without warfare, sabotage, and malicious civil strife. As a result, our transportation infrastructure is based on sound engineering practices that emphasize issues like reliability, availability, safety and maintainability, but they have generally not considered the issue of network survivability under malicious or extreme events. Incidents of malicious attacks to the electric power grid, for example, are increasing and the damage sustained is now second only to nature disasters, (1). Real-time control systems -especially those governing critical infrastructures such as transportation -need to be reliable and secure under normal operating conditions and survivable under abnormal conditions. Further, given the fact that more and more of the surface transportation system can be remotely or automatically controlled via communication infrastructures, it is no longer sufficient to consider the analysis of the transportation network, its power and control system, and the communication infrastructure in separation. Transportation networks should be designed and operated so that essential services will survive even in the presence of malicious faults, intrusions, and attacks. Survivability is defined as the capability of a system to fulfill its mission in a timely manner, even in the presence of component failures caused by intrusions, attacks, sabotage, accidents or natural disasters. Hence, survivability assessment is a much needed engineering technique to be employed during the planning, design, and operation of surface transportation networks. In this paper, a survivability analysis for the city of Boise, Idaho's, Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) network is presented. Two different survivability assessment techniques are presented and applied: (1) a qualitative approach based on the Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) as modified for critical infrastructures, and (2) a quantitative multilayered graph-analytic approach based on the city's power grid and surface transportation network.
Several approaches to assessing a transportation system for its ability to maintain service have been documented and a wide variety of measures have been proposed, including: reliability, vulnerability, risk, and survivability. Most strategies for assessing transportation systems for their ability to maintain performance have focused on reliability. A variety of performance measures have been considered over the years; the most prominent measures are connectivity and terminal reliability, capacity reliability, and travel time/cost reliability (2, 3, 4) . While reliability serves as an adequate measure for assigning probabilities of satisfying a fixed level of performance based on the presence of benign factors, it does not consider the weakness (vulnerability) of networks operating under malicious or hostile conditions. Survivability, while not commonly addressed in transportation literature, forms a prominent area of active research in networked systems. Carnegie-Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute originated an analytic approach for networked systems referred to as the Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) in 1997 (5, 6, 7, 8) . In the SSA process, the "criticality" of components is analyzed. Essential components provide services or satisfy properties that must be maintained during an attack. Compromisable components can be penetrated and damaged by intrusion (attack). Soft-spot components are both essential and compromisable. Accordingly, survivability can be viewed as an umbrella term incorporating security, reliability, fault tolerance, dependability, and other aspects of a system that contribute to the maintained realization of a system's mission. Several surface transportation security research efforts have been focused on identifying network critical points. An example of such research is the Disruption Impact Estimation Tool for Transportation (DIETT) presented in NCHRP report 525, (9), a tool for prioritizing high value Transportation Choke Points (TCP) according to their potential economic impact on the flow of commercial traffic.
The SSA-based qualitative technique presented in this paper modifies the canonical technique applied in survivable network analysis to make it applicable to critical infrastructures such as ITS networks. The three major modifications are: 1) including the development of a stakeholder-by-responsibility matrix, 2) the enumeration of both physical and cyber threats, and 3) the development of a threat-by-component matrix. The analysis identifies threat mitigation strategies for each threat identified and provides suggestions for improved security and survivability (10, 11, 12) . The multilayered graph-based quantitative technique takes an approach common to object-oriented and event-driven systems. It separates the transportation network into multiple layers with distinct but related functionalities and analyzes the failure propagation across different layers, focusing on distinct layers when considering the criticality of the system components. The primary objectives of this analysis are as follows: a) Describe a modified SSA for critical infrastructures and apply the analysis to a large scale ITS network (the City of Boise ITS network), b) Define and apply a strategy for partitioning a transportation system into distinct functional layers representing the physical, control, and power infrastructures, and c) Quantify the criticality of network components within each layer and among different layers.
QUALITATIVE SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR ITS NETWORKS
To accommodate the more diverse needs of the multiple stakeholders involved in the ITS network, and the resulting complexity of the system architecture, the SSA process was modified to account for factors relevant to the analysis of the ITS network. The full process of the modified SSA analysis includes the following seven steps (4,8,10):
1. Define the System's Mission Statement: Define the mission to be performed by the system. Identify stakeholders, components, ownership, and other details which will be relevant to later stages of the analysis. 2. Identify Stakeholder Needs and Responsibilities: Identify stakeholders' needs and which stakeholders are responsible for which components and services. 3. Define Logical System Components and Architecture: More completely define system components and architecture. This detailed component description will later be used to identify critical components. The architecture is defined in terms of network topology, component locations and component interactions. 4. Define Normal Usage Scenarios: Mission objectives are fulfilled by executing normal usage scenarios (NUS). In this stage, normal usage scenarios are associated with components and services in order to identify which components are essential, and which stakeholders are responsible for maintaining these components. 5. Define Possible Attack Scenarios and Threats: In this stage, analysts utilize knowledge of system design to take on the role of an intelligent adversary, attempting to maliciously manipulate the system. This yields a list of attack scenarios, along with corresponding components and services. In the process, accident scenarios are also considered, accounting for natural disasters and accidental destruction to system components. In our qualitative analysis, threats were classified as either physical or electronic. Also, many threats apply to multiple components, so grouping components within a single threat category significantly simplifies later analysis. Based on these attack scenarios, physical and electronic threats are listed in the corresponding compromised component categories, and then organized into a threat-by-component matrix. 6. Identify Threat Mitigation Strategies: During this phase, system components are analyzed for mitigations to the threats identified earlier. This stage provides a preliminary overview of how components can be protected against each threat to enhance system survivability. 7. Develop Network Survivability Map: Survivability enhancements generally fall into three categories: recognition, resistance, and recovery. In a survivability map, threats are listed along with affected components and services, and for each of these threats, current strategies and recommended improvements are listed. The survivability map focuses on the critical components for which effective improvements can be applied.
The survivability analysis of the city of Boise ITS network proceeded as per the above seven steps, but the report compiled from the above activities is too large a work to be included here. It is available as a technical report, (13). Findings from the qualitative survivability analysis showed that a loss of power supply at the Traffic management Centers (TMC) or at critical network intersections could have a paralyzing effect on the ability of the network to provide several of its essential services. An operational-ready alternate TMC and effective traffic management plans for critical intersections during power outages were identified as possible mitigation strategies for these threats. Table 1 and Table 2 are excerpts of the report and show the threat by component matrix (step 5) and possible mitigation strategies (step 6) for physical and electronic threats.
QUANTITATIVE SURVIVABLE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR ITS NETWORKS -MULTI-LAYER NETWORK ANALYSIS
The main goal of the multilayered quantitative graph-based analysis is to compute the essentiality of each component with respect to each infrastructure layer and rank-order these essentialities to determine the most essential components with respect to that layer and other layers on which the components depend. A stylized multilayer representation of ITS networks is presented in Figure 1 . The ITS network is represented by three separate, but interrelated layers: (1) the electric power grid layer, (2) the communication network layer, and (3) the physical roadway and control (e.g., traffic signal) network layer. Error and failure propagation across layers is also represented in Figure 1 . For example, a power layer failure will affect both the communication and control layers and therefore affect what can transit on the physical layer. A failure in the communication layer will affect the control and, hence, the physical layer, but a failure in the physical (roadway) layer will affect only that layer. The essentiality of each network component with respect to its layer can be determined using the following relationship:
Where: e L (c) denotes the essentiality of component c with respect to layer L, p L denotes the performance of layer L during normal operations (when no components have been damaged or disabled), and
Given these essentialities, we can define a weighting scheme that apportions weights w L (c) to components proportionally to their essentiality. One convenient way is to compute the total of essentialities of all components under consideration, denoted t L and assign:
This assignment has the property that the sum of the weights is 1, and thus w L (c) describes relative importance in terms of a percentage relative to all components under consideration. Given this notation and the performance measures defined above, we can compute performance, essentiality, and weight for each component with respect to each layer. Then, given a suitable choice of weights when measuring performance, we can evaluate p L (c), e L (c), and w L (c) for each layer L and component c. However, as previous analysis showed that communication failures were less essential than power component failures, (4), we concentrate on the analysis of component essentialities with respect to the relationship between electric power and vehicle traffic on the physical/control layer. We show how full or partial loss of electric power affects vehicle traffic, what areas are affected and how, and briefly discuss mitigation schemes to enhance survivability.
Essentiality of Network Components: Graph-Based Measures
The electric power layer represents the power supply for all essential network components that provide network control (traffic controllers, signals, and ramp meters), network monitoring and surveillance (Closed Circuit TV cameras (CCTVs), Loops and video detectors), and traveler information dissemination (changeable message signs (CMS)). In large scale ITS networks the power network typically consists of multiple high-voltage transmission power lines and distribution substations. Mapping the power network components and different field devices they serve to a graph is non-trivial.
The city of Boise, the capital of the state of Idaho, is one of the fastest growing cities in the nation. The city transportation network consists of more than 260 major signalized intersections and approximately 29 miles of urban freeways with 12 interchanges. In 1999, the city installed CCTV cameras and CMS on freeways and arterials as part of an integrated incident management system. The Boise area transportation network is managed by Ada County Highway District (ACHD) through its Traffic Management Center (TMC). All 260 signalized intersections in the network are connected to the TMC. The signalized intersections are controlled by centralized control software.
In the case of Boise ITS network, two different GIS databases were used to create the power network graph. The first was a GIS database that defined the geographic boundaries of each power substation and the second GIS database included the geographic locations of different network devices such as signalized intersections, CCTVs, and CMS. The two GIS databases were synchronized and combined using the same reference point and the new database was used to associate field devices to the power substation they are served from. A Matlab script used the coordinates of different field devices and the substation association to create the power network graph. Field visits were used to verify and validate the resulting power network graph and power line routes. Figure 2 presents the Boise area high-voltage transmission power grid. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the distribution power grids for the greater Boise area and the downtown Boise area respectively. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) shows the graph representation for the physical (roadway) and signalized intersections network.
As can be seen in Figure 2, The essentiality of each of these components was assessed using two different methods following equation (1). The first method determined the essentiality based on the number of field devices (signalized intersections) affected by a loss of service or failure of the power network component. The second method determined the essentiality based on the total number of vehicles affected by a loss of service failure of the power network component. Average hourly volume during afternoon peak period at each signalized were used in this analysis. The results of the two methods are presented in Table 3 and Table 4 . The two methods showed similar results. The Spearmans rank-order correlation coefficient between the two methods was 0.907, which indicate that the essentiality rank orders obtained through the two methods, the number of intersections served by the substation affected and number of vehicles served by the substation affected, are significantly correlated.
The essentiality values obtained from the graph analysis using either of the two proposed methods enable decision makers to assess the damage expected from failure in any of the power network components. For example, based on the results shown in Tables 3 and 4 , a loss of service in the Boise power substation would affect approximately 28% of the signalized intersections, and if this happens during PM peak periods, this will affect approximately 25% of the vehicles using the network. These data can be used by the decision makers to take policy decisions regarding possible failure mitigation strategies.
Essentiality of Network Components: Network-Modeling-Based Measures
The graph-based essentiality values presented in the previous section provide a general and broad quantitative measure of the essentiality of each network component. To be able to better quantify the essentiality of each network component and hence to assess the survivability of the network in absence of one or more network components, essentiality values that are based on a more detailed modeling of network operations should be used. In a previous research, (4), microscopic simulation was used to assess the essentiality of different components in a small urban ITS network with 16 signalized intersections. For large scale urban ITS networks, similar to the city of Boise ITS network, actual run time for a single run of a microscopic model could exceed several hours, especially if dynamic route assignment models requiring several iterations are employed. Accordingly, planning-level macroscopic models are more appropriate for this type of analysis. Several of these models are available such as Transim, Dynasmart-P, Cube, and VISUM, the later was used in this analysis.
VISUM is a macro-simulation model that uses a dynamic stochastic assignment procedure to determine the shortest route between each origin-destination pair, (14). For each simulation time slice, the shortest route for departure in the time slice is determined using a timedependent, best path algorithm. The model reports detailed output including zone-to-zone travel time as well as network wide travel time as Vehicle-Hour-Travel. The macroscopic VISUM model for the Boise ITS network is shown in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) . The network consists of 76 zones and includes 260 signalized intersections. Traffic volumes, based on the 2004 traffic counts at different locations throughout the network, were used to calibrate and validate the model. Figure 6 shows a comparison between traffic counts obtained from VISUM output and actual traffic counts at 31 major locations. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was used to test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between VISUM output and actual traffic counts at the 0.05 level of significance level. The F-value is 0.14, smaller than the F-critical value of 2.1, which means the statistical result fails to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the mean values for these two traffic count values. Furthermore, as shown in the bottom portion of Figure 6 , the distribution of VISUM and 2004 Average Daily Traffic (ADT) data is close to a 45-degree line with no outliers and it has the R-square value 0.9482, which further validates the output of the simulation model. Several performance measures can be used to describe the quality of operations in the network. In this analysis, total network travel time (TTT) was used as the primary measure. The TTT during the normal operation scenario was used as the benchmark against which the TTT recorded during event-based (aka, failure scenarios with a given component c disabled) are compared. An event-based network measure was calculated using the formula: 
The event-based scenarios tested in the analysis are based on the following assumptions: 1. Failure in a power substation will lead to a power outage at all devices served by this substation. The average duration of the power outage is one hour representing the average time needed to manually switch the devices to a functioning substation. 2. Failure at the power transformer supplying local field devices will result in one hour power outage at this device, representing the time needed to restore the power by replacing the transformer or switching to another transformer. 3. Power outage at a signalized intersection will switch the control at that intersection to All-Way-Stop-Control (AWSC). 4. Loss of communication to/from a signalized intersection will switch the control to the default control plan. This automatic switch to local control causes relatively minor disruption to the overall network operations, especially if the default control plans are continuously updated. 5. Power outage or communication loss at CCTVs or CMS locations will lead to a complete loss of functionality of the device.
The analysis presented in this paper is focused on power failure events at signalized intersections and power substations. A total of 38 failure events were modeled representing a one-hour failure at each of the 13 power substations and a one-hour power failure at 25 major signalized intersections. The 25 major intersections were chosen based on the total traffic using the intersection during afternoon peak period. Each failure event was modeled using the VISUM model. The simulation duration for all runs was four hours with the one-hour power failure occurring 30 minutes after the start of the simulation. In addition, the simulation model was run with no failure events to determine the normal total travel time on the network. Traffic volumes used in the macroscopic simulation analysis represented the afternoon peak hour traffic volume in the network. Table 5 presents the increased network travel time as a result of a one-hour power failure at each of the major 25 intersections in the network. The increase in travel time is a result of changing the intersection control to AWSC during the power outage. This represents the case of blank or flashing signal heads at the intersection. The increase in travel time as a result of this one-hour power failure at a single intersection ranged from a high of 1997 vehicle-hours to a low of 603 vehicle-hours, representing 2.07% and 0.63% of the total network travel time, respectively. The increase in travel time depends on many factors such as the level of travel demand at the intersection and the availability of and level of congestion on alternative routes. While the impact of a single intersection failure on the network-wide total travel time seems marginal (high of 2.07% and low of 0.63%), the impact of the failure on the area adjacent to the intersection and the number of vehicles affected are considerable. The use of multiple power feeds and/or backup power supplies for the traffic signal cabinets and alternative intersection management strategies during power outages at the intersections that have the highest increase in network travel time can mitigate the effect of the power outage and minimize the impact on the network, increasing its survivability to such failure events. Table 6 presents the increased network travel time as a result of a one-hour power failure at each of the 12 power substations that serve the ITS network. A failure in a substation would result in a power outage at all intersections served by this power station. Changing the control of the intersections served by the substation to AWSC has led to a significant increase in networkwide total travel time. For a substation serving 10 or more intersections, the percent increase ranged from 81.34% to 88.25% with an average increase in network-wide total delay of more than 80,000 vehicle-hours during the four-hour simulation period. Disabling these large numbers of nearby intersections at the same time for a one-hour period will lead to fully congested situations for large areas of the network. Measures such as redundant power supply at critical intersections and major substations, fast automatic switching between substations during power failures, and expedite a response to substation failure could minimize the impact of substation failure on the network, increasing the network survivability to such failure events.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a case study to assess the survivability of a large-scale urban transportation network is presented. Two different survivability assessment techniques were applied and summarized briefly, because the detail and size of the full survivability report prohibits its inclusion here. The first analytic approach was based on CMU's SSA as modified for critical infrastructures. The qualitative analysis is lengthy and relatively subjective, but it successfully identifies which components are essential and compromisable (i.e., soft-spots). However, SSA does not provide a quantification of how essential or compromisable the component is, and offers no indication of the degree to which suggested mitigations actually improve the system. The modified SSA presented in this paper and elsewhere (3, 9, 10, 11) , does however provide a systematic means of including multiple stakeholders with individual goals and responsibilities, classifying the wide variety of components found in transportation systems, and combining existing knowledge with modern contributions to efficiently identify physical and cyber threats to each component and mitigations for each threat.
The second analytic approach described in this paper applies a multilayered graph-based method to provide a quantitative assessment of network survivability. For most ITS's the multilayered approach would incorporate three layers: (1) electric power, (2) communications, and (3) physical roads and traffic controls. In this paper we focused our analysis on the interrelationships between electric power and traffic controls, in order to assess the effect electric power outages have on vehicular traffic on the physical transportation network. Macroscopic modeling was used to investigate the effect of different component failures on the network's operational characteristics. The analyses presented here provide the means of assessing the importance of different components in critical infrastructure layers, thus allowing decision makers to better understand failure events and prioritize threat mitigation alternatives. 
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